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Abstract—Data is the new oil; this refrain is repeated exten-
sively in the age of internet tracking, machine learning, and
data analytics. As data collection becomes more personal and
pervasive, however, public pressure is mounting for privacy pro-
tection. In this atmosphere, developers have created applications
to add noise to user attributes visible to tracking algorithms.
This creates a strategic interaction between trackers and users
when incentives to maintain privacy and improve accuracy are
misaligned. In this paper, we conceptualize this conflict through
an N + 1-player, augmented Stackelberg game. First a machine
learner declares a privacy protection level, and then users
respond by choosing their own perturbation amounts. We use
the general frameworks of differential privacy and empirical
risk minimization to quantify the utility components due to
privacy and accuracy, respectively. In equilibrium, each user
perturbs her data independently, which leads to a high net loss
in accuracy. To remedy this scenario, we show that the learner
improves his utility by proactively perturbing the data himself.
While other work in this area has studied privacy markets and
mechanism design for truthful reporting of user information, we
take a different viewpoint by considering both user and learner
perturbation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the modern digital ecosystem, users leave behind rich
trails of behavioral information. On the internet, websites send
user data to third-party trackers such as advertising agencies,
social networking sites, and data analytic companies [15].
Tracking is not limited, of course, to the internet. The internet
of things (IoT) is a phenomenon that refers to the standard-
ization and integration of communications between physical
devices in a way that mimics the connection of computers
on the internet. IoT devices such as smartwatches include
accelerometers, heart rate sensors, and sleep trackers that
measure and upload data about users’ physical and medical
conditions [21]. Data from these applications data can be used
to improve product or service quality or to drive social change.
For example, continuous glucose monitors can provide closed-
loop blood glucose control for users with diabetes [1], [17].
The smart grid and renewable energy also stand to benefit from
developments in networks of sensors and actuators [5].
A. Privacy in Machine Learning
While these technologies promise positive impacts, they also
threaten privacy. Specifically, the IoT involves new threats in
This work is partially supported by the grant CNS-1544782, EFRI-1441140
and SES-1541164 from National Science Foundation.
the form of information access, because devices may directly
collect sensitive information such as health and location data
[3]. In addition, the pervasiveness of tracking and the de-
velopment of analytics have enabled learners to infer habits
and physical conditions over time. These inferences may
run even to the granularity of “a user’s mood; stress levels;
personality type; bipolar disorder; demographics” [18]. These
are unprecedented degrees of access to user information. This
access has prompted both qualitative and quantitative privacy
research.
While several methods have been developed to quantify pri-
vacy, we focus on one particular notion in this paper. Proposed
by Cynthia Dwork, differential privacy is a mathematical
framework which gives probable limits on the disclosure risks
that individuals incur by participating in a database [10], [11],
[12]. Using DP, learning algorithms can publish a guarantee
on the amount of information disclosed: namely, the constant
often denoted ǫp. Currently, however, there seems to be little
incentives for trackers to adopt DP methods.
B. User Obfuscation Technologies
To remedy this situation, developers have begun to help
users perturb data on their own. Finn and Nissenbaum describe
two examples: CacheCloak and TrackMeNot [6]. TrackMeNot
is a browser extension that generates decoy search queries in
order to prevent trackers from assembling accurate profiles
of its users [14]. In the realm of IoT, CacheCloak provides
a way for users to access location-based services without
revealing their exact geographical positions [16]. The app
predicts multiple possibilities for the path of a user, and
then retrieves location-based information for each path. This
means that an adversary tracking the requests is left with
many possible paths rather than a unique one. As another
example, the browser extension ScareMail adds words relevant
to terrorism to every email that a user issues, postulating
that wide adoption of this technique would make dragnet
surveillance difficult [2]. Apparently, however, such privacy
protection involves costs not only for governments but also
for the whole population of users.
C. Learner-User Interaction
This conflict can be studied by an interaction between N
users and a machine learner. This data flow in Fig. 1. In
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Figure 1. Data flow in the obfuscation-tracking model. Users 1, . . . , N have
data xi with labels yi. Before submitting this data to a classifier, the users
add noise vi ∼ Vi, and the learner can add noise wi ∼ W . The classifier is
fd. The stars indicate that the learner is the privacy adversary.
general, both the users and the learner could be interested in
the privacy and accuracy of the learning outcome. But these
incentives are probably not aligned. Hence the interaction is
strategic, and aptly studied by game theory.
We model the user-learner interaction as a two-step process
in which the learner first announces his perturbation level,
and then the users respond by implementing their own pertur-
bation. This is a realistic assumption, since a critical aspect
of DP is the ability to publish measurable privacy guarantees.
Knowing this protection, users can decide whether to add their
own perturbation in order to further protect their information.
The dynamic, two-stage nature of this interaction suggests the
framework of Stackelberg games [22], [4].
D. Content and Contributions
In Section II we describe the machine learning technique
of Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) and the framework of
DP. Then, in Section III, we employ DP to quantify utility loss
due to privacy compromise, and ERM to quantify utility gained
through an accurate predictor. In Section IV, we review the
solution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium, and we study the
equilibrium in Section V. Finally, we discuss the importance
of the results in Section VI.
In summary, this paper presents the following contributions:
1) We create a Stackelberg game model to study the conflict
between tracking and obfuscation.
2) Our model uses the framework of ERM to quantify accu-
racy, and DP to quantify privacy loss. These frameworks
are sufficiently broad to be used for many different
application areas.
3) We find that, while the accuracy levels of all of the users
are interdependent, the strategic optimal perturbation
level for each user is independent of the perturbation
levels of all of the other users (Remark 5).
4) In equilibrium, if the learning algorithm adds sufficient
perturbation, it can dissuade the users from obfuscating
the data themselves (Remark 8).
5) When the cost of user perturbation is high, protect-
ing user privacy by proactively perturbing is incentive-
compatible for the learner (Remark 9).
E. Related Work
In order to address incentive-compatibility, a vein of re-
search has arisen in privacy markets. In [13], a learner
computes a sum of the private bits of a set of users and
tries to either maximize accuracy or minimize cost. This paper
assumes that users report their data truthfully but can misrep-
resent their individual valuation of their privacy. Later authors
interchanged these assumptions [23]. In work by Chessa et
al. [9], [8], users play a multiple person, prior-commitment
game, which determines how much they perturb. The present
paper differs from all four of these works because it considers
the learner as an additional strategic player. Shokri et al.
[19] formulate a Stackelberg game for preserving location
privacy. In this game, the user is the leader and the learner
is the follower. After the user chooses a perturbation strategy,
the learner chooses an optimal reconstruction of the user’s
location. By contrast, in our model the learner chooses a
promised level of privacy protection before the user acts,
which makes the learner a Stackelberg leader. Lastly, unlike
all of the previous works, our model uses both empirical risk
minimization and differential privacy.
II. EMPIRICAL RISK MINIMIZATION AND DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACY MODELS
Consider an interaction between a set of users i ∈ S =
{1, . . . , N} and a learner L, in which users submit possibly-
perturbed data to L, and L releases a statistic or predictor of
the data fd (hereafter, an output). Assume that the data gener-
ating process is a random variable Z with a fixed but unknown
distribution. Denote the realized data by zi
i.i.d.
∼ Z, i ∈ S. Each
data point is composed of a feature vector xi ∈ Rd and a label
yi ∈ {−1, 1} . The goal of the learner L is to predict yi given
xi, based on the trained classifier or predictor fd.
In general, privacy loss can occur 1) with respect to L,
and 2) with respect to the public who observes the output
of the ERM. In order to narrow the scope of this paper, we
consider information disclosure with respect to L. In addition,
information can be leaked through 1) the attributes xi and 2)
the labels yi. We focus on loss due to xi, although analysis
using yi would follow many of the same principles.
With the threat of user perturbation, we investigate whether
it is advantageous for L to proactively protect the privacy
of the users. Thus, we allow L to perturb the submitted
data, also before she views it1. Assume that L adds noise
with the same variance to each data point xi. For i ∈ S,
k ∈ 1, . . . , d, the learner draws w(k)i
i.i.d
∼ W , where W is a
mean-zero Gaussian random variable2 with standard deviation
σL. Then the user adds noise v(k)i
i.i.d.
∼ Vi, k ∈ 1, . . . , d, where
Vi is also Gaussian. The perturbed data points are given by
x˜i = xi + vi +wi, i ∈ S. Figure 1 summarizes this flow of
data.
1L must use a trusted execution environment in order to perturb the data.
Alternatively, L may accomplish this purpose by collecting data at a lower
granularity from the users.
2While DP often considers Laplace noise, we use Gaussian noise for reasons
of mathematical convenience.
A. Empirical Risk Minimization
In empirical risk minimization, L calculates a value of
output fd ∈ F that minimizes the empirical risk, i.e., the
total penalty due to imperfect classification of the realized
data. Define the loss function l (z˜i, f) , which expresses the
penalty due to a single perturbed data point zi for the output
f . Next let Λ ≥ 0 be a constant and R (f) be a regularization
term. For zi in the database D, the total empirical risk is
J (f , D) = ΛR (f) + 1
N
∑
i
l (zi, f) . L obtains fd given by Eq.
1. Unperturbed data gives the classifier f† in Eq. 2:
fd = argmin
f∈F
ΛR (f) +
1
N
∑
i
l (z˜i, f) , (1)
f
† = argmin
f∈F
ΛR (f) +
1
N
∑
i
l (zi, f) . (2)
Expected loss provides a measure of the accuracy of the
output of ERM. Let f∗ denote the f which minimizes the
expected loss for unperturbed data:
f
∗ = argmin
f∈F
E {ΛR (f) + l (Z, f)} . (3)
This forms a reference to which the expected loss of fd on data
Z can be compared. Let ǫg be a positive scalar that bounds
the difference in expected loss between the perturbed classifier
and the population-optimal classifier. This quantity is given by
E {ΛR (fd) + l (Z, fd)} ≤ E {ΛR (f
∗) + l (Z, f∗)}+ǫg. (4)
We use this difference to formulate the accuracy component
of utility in Section III.
B. Differential Privacy
Let A (∗) denote an algorithm and D denote a database.
Let D′ denote a database that differs from D by only one
entry (e.g., the entry of the user under consideration). Let c
be some set among all possible sets C in which the output of
the algorithm A may fall. Then Definition 1 quantifies privacy
using the framework of DP [7], [10].
Definition 1. (ǫp-DP) - An algorithm A (B) taking values in
a set C provides (ǫp, δ)-differential privacy if, for all D, D′
that differ in at most one entry, and for all c ∈ C,
P {A (D) ∈ c} ≤ exp (ǫp)P {A (D
′) ∈ c}+ δ. (5)
For a fixed δ, the degree of randomness determines the
privacy level ǫp. Lower values of ǫp correspond to more
privacy. That randomness is attained through the noise added
in the forms of V and W .
III. DYNAMIC USER-LEARNER INTERACTION
We now use the methods for quantification of accuracy
and privacy described in Section II as components of utility
functions for the users and the learner.
A. Utility Functions
Let U iS
(
σL, σ
−i
S , σ
i
S
)
give the utility that each user i
receives when the learner chooses perturbation σL, user i
chooses perturbation level σiS , and all of the other users
choose perturbation levels σ−iS , {σ
j
S}j∈S\i. Similarly, let
UL (σL, σS) be a utility function for the learner, L, where
σS , {σ
j
S}j∈S . The utility functions have components due
to accuracy, privacy, and cost of perturbation. Note that each
user’s perturbation affects her own privacy directly, but affects
her accuracy only after ERM based on all users’ data points.
B. Accuracy Component of Utility
The accuracy component of utility is determined by the
accuracy of fd as a function of σL and σS . This accuracy
is in terms of the difference ǫg in expected loss between the
perturbed and unperturbed classifiers (Eq. 4). The relationship
is summarized by Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. (Accuracy Constant ǫg) For a fixed distribution
Z, define expected loss by Jˆ (f) = E(x,y)∼Z
{
l
(
f
T
x, y
)}
+
Λ
2 ‖f‖
2 . Then the dependence of the difference in expected
loss on the user and learner perturbation levels is given, with
some chosen probability, by
Jˆ (fd)− Jˆ (f
∗) =∝
1
nΛ2
(
σ2L +
∑
i
1
n
(
σiS
)2)
. (6)
Proof: See Appendix.
Equation 6 will be used to formulate the utility component
of accuracy in Subsection III-E.
C. Privacy Component of Utility
The privacy of the data xi, i ∈ S submitted to L is achieved
by the Gaussian mechanism [12].
Definition 3. (Gaussian Mechanism) Let a database consist of
entries x ∈ X, and denote the space of all possible databases
by N|X|. Let A : NX → Rd be an arbitrary d-dimensional
function. The Gaussian Mechanism with parameter σ adds
noise with mean 0 and variance σ2 to each of the d components
of the output.
In [12], Dwork and Roth obtain a differential privacy
guarantee for the Gaussian Mechanism, solved here for ǫp. We
use the fact that the total perturbation Vi +W has standard
deviation
√
σ2L +
(
σiS
)2
.
Theorem 4. Let S (A) denote the L2 sensitivity ofA. For ǫp ∈
(0, 1) , the Gaussian Mechanism achieves (ǫp, δ)-differential
privacy if σ satisfies
ǫp =
2
√
2 ln (1.25/δ)
σ
∝
1√
σ2L +
(
σiS
)2 . (7)
D. Perturbation Cost Component of Utility
How can the cost of perturbation be defined? Currently,
many applications that perturb user data are free. This is true
of TrackMeNot, CacheCloak, and ScareMail. On the other
hand, users experience some non-monetary cost (e.g., time,
learning curve, aversion to degrading quality of data). This cost
is arguably flat with respect to perturbation amount. Define
the perturbation components of utility for variances of σ2L and(
σiS
)2 by N¯L1{σL>0} and N¯ iS1{σiS>0}, respectively, where
N¯L and N¯ iS are positive coefficients.
E. Total Utility Functions
The utility functions in are given by combining the utility
terms due to accuracy, privacy, and perturbation cost. Define
G¯L and G¯iS as positive values of the unperturbed accuracy to
the learner and to each user i, respectively. Let γL and γiS
adjust the rate of utility loss due to accuracy. Next, let P¯ iS
denote the maximum privacy loss to user i, which she incurs
if the data is not perturbed at all3. Finally, we use ρiS > 0
to scale the rate of privacy loss for user i. Now the utility
functions are given by:
UL (σL, σS) = G¯L −
γL
nΛ2
(
σ2L +
∑
i
1
n
(
σiS
)2)
−
1
N
∑
i
P¯ iS
1 + ρiS
√
σ2L +
(
σiS
)2 − N¯L1{σL>0}, (8)
U iS
(
σL, σ
−i
S , σ
i
S
)
= G¯iS −
γiS
nΛ2
(
σ2L +
∑
i
1
n
(
σiS
)2)
−
P¯ iS
1 + ρiS
√
σ2L +
(
σiS
)2 − N¯ iS1{σiS>0}. (9)
F. Independence of the Users
Notice that the derivative of U iS
(
σL, σ
−i
S , σ
i
S
)
with respect
to σiS is not a function of any σ
j
S for j ∈ S\i. This leads to
the following remark.
Remark 5. The optimal perturbation level for each user is
independent of the actions of the other users.
In fact, this is analogous to the prisoner’s dilemma, in which
the utilities of the players are coupled although the optimal
actions are not. The independence of the users provides the
following useful fact.
Remark 6. The equilibrium of the N + 1-player game can
be found as by considering all of the users as one aggregate
player, since their strategies are independent. The solution
concept is a traditional Stackelberg equilibrium.
3We have made the privacy term for L proportional to the average privacy
of the users, based on an assumption that L benefits from adding value in
the form of privacy to the users. Other parameters are used to set the relative
importance of privacy and accuracy for the users.
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Figure 2. Stackelberg game interaction between the learner and the set of
users. This diagram depicts the flow of actions, rather than the flow of data.
IV. SOLUTION CONCEPT
Figure 2 depicts the flow of actions in the Stackleberg game.
L chooses perturbation level σL, which he announces. Then
the users respond with their own perturbation levels σiS , i ∈ S.
The users’ strategies are independent of each other, but L must
act in anticipation of the actions of the set of all of the users.
Definition 7 describes a Stackelberg equilibrium. Define
BRiS : R+ → R+, such that σiS = BRiS (σL) gives strategy
σiS which best responds to the learner’s perturbation level σL,
and let BRS (σL) ,
{
BRiS (σL)
}
i∈S
.
Definition 7. (Stackelberg Equilibrium) The strategy profile(
σL,
{
σiS
}
i∈S
)
is a Stackelberg equilibrium if, ∀i ∈ S,
σi∗S = BR
i
S (σ
∗
L) , argmax
σi
S
U iS
(
σ∗L, σ
−i∗
S σ
i
S
)
, (10)
σ∗L = argmax
σL
UL (σL, BRS (σL)) . (11)
The order of solution is the reverse of the chronological
order; the best response function BRiS (σ∗L) must be found
first from Eq. 10. Then it is possible to solve Eq. 11.
V. ANALYSIS
Because of the discontinuity in U iS
(
σL, σ
−i
S , σ
i
S
)
introduced
by the initial cost of perturbation, the best response function
σi∗S = BR
i
S (σ
∗
L) is cumbersome to solve analytically. There-
fore, we solve for the Stackelberg equilibrium numerically.
Figure 3 displays the results, in which the three columns
represent user perturbation cost N¯ iS = 10, 20, 30 with other
parameters held fixed.
Row 1 of the Fig. 3 depicts the optimization problem of the
users. For σiS > 0, the users pick σiS which optimally balances
their individual privacy-accuracy preferences. This σiS could
be large, because each user’s perturbation level affects his
own accuracy only as one data point among many, whereas it
directly affects improves privacy. At exactly σiS = 0, however,
the user’s utility jumps because he does not need to pay the
perturbation cost. Row 2 illustrates this bang-bang behavior,
which is summarized by Remark 8.
Remark 8. At sufficiently-high σL (the independent variable),
the users’ privacy benefit becomes small enough that it is
outweighed by the cost of perturbation, and BRiS (σL) falls
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Figure 3. Row 1) User i utility U i
S
(
σL, σ
−i
S
, σi
S
)
versus σi
S
for various learner perturbation levels. Row 2) BRi
S
(σL) , based on the σiS which achieves
the highest utility for each curve in Row 1. Row 3) Learner utility UL
(
σL, BR
i
S
(σL)
)
, with σL on the independent axis. From L to R, user perturbation
cost N¯S
i
= 10, 20, 30. As N¯S
i
increases, it becomes feasible for L to perturb enough to discourage users from perturbing.
to 0. As N¯ iS increases (from left to right in Fig. 3), the σL to
dissuade user perturbation decreases.
This raises the question of whether the benefit of dissuading
user perturbation could be enough to justify the loss in
accuracy and perturbation cost of adding σL. Remark 9 states
the numerical result shown in Row 3 of the figure.
Remark 9. In Column 1 (N¯ iS = 10), the σL required to
dissuade user perturbation is sufficiently high so that the
benefits are outweighed by the loss in accuracy. In the other
columns, the accuracy loss that L experiences due to her own
perturbation is overcome by the gain that she experiences when
the users stop perturbing.
In Columns 2 and 3, the jumps in UL are high enough that
they exceed the utility levels at σL = 0, and justify proactive
perturbation. In general, the higher the user perturbation cost
N¯ iS , the less L needs to perturb to dissuade users from
perturbing. The equilibrium in which L perturbs proactively
can be stated as follows.
1) Users prefer some privacy protection and are willing to
invest in technology for obfuscation if necessary.
2) This obfuscation would be detrimental to L.
3) Instead, L can perturb the data proactively.
4) L need only match the users’ desires for privacy up
to their perturbation costs N¯ iS . Then the users are
satisfied with L’s privacy protection and do not invest
in obfuscation.
In some cases (i.e., Columns 2-4 of Fig. 3), L improves his
utility over cases in which the users perturb. Our findings do
not guarantee this result in all cases, but provide a foundation
for examining in which parameter regions L can improve his
utility by protecting privacy proactively.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this tracking-obfuscation interaction, the utility of each
of the users are interrelated, since they all affect the accu-
racy of the output. Somewhat surprisingly, the optimal user
perturbation levels as functions of the learner perturbation
level are independent of one another. This leads to a self-
interested behavior on the part of the users and a high accuracy
loss on the part of the learner. In order to mitigate this
problem, we have shown that a learner can sometimes dissuade
users from data obfuscation by proactively perturbing collected
information to some degree. Although she still must satisfy the
users’ desired accuracy-privacy trade-off, she must only do so
to within some constant: the flat cost of user perturbation.
If user perturbation is sufficiently costly, privacy protection
is incentive compatible for the learner. For future work, we
anticipate studying an incomplete information version of the
game, in which users’ privacy preferences are unknown, as
well as a version of the game in which the number of players
is a random variable. These steps will help to better understand
and forecast the balance of power between user obfuscation
and machine learning.
APPENDIX
Theorem 2 is proved using three lemmas. Lemma 10
bounds the difference between the perturbed and unperturbed
classifiers.
Lemma 10. (Bound on difference between classifiers) Assume
that |l′ (z)| ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ l′′ (z) ≤ c. Then, for ERM with L2-
regularization, the magnitude of the difference between the
unperturbed classifier f† and the input-perturbed classifier fd
is bounded in terms of ‖fd‖ by the deterministic quantity:
∥∥f† − fd∥∥2 ≤ 1 + c2 ‖fd‖2
n2Λ2
∑
i
‖vi +wi‖
2
. (12)
Essentially, the proof comes from comparing the first-order
conditions for each of the classifiers. Note that when norms
are not specified, we refer to the L2-norm. Using this result,
Lemma 11 bounds the difference in empirical loss.
Lemma 11. (Bound in difference in empirical loss) For any
realized database D, the empirical loss is bounded by
J (fd, D)− J
(
f
†, D
)
≤
∥∥fd − f†∥∥2 (1 + c) . (13)
The proof of this lemma is based on work on empirical risk
minimization in [7]. The next step is to bound the difference
in expected loss using the difference in empirical loss. The
result is given in Lemma 12.
Lemma 12. (Bound in difference in expected loss) The dif-
ference in expected loss due to fd and f∗ satisfies, with
probability 1− δ,
Jˆ (fd)−Jˆ (f
∗) ≤ 2
[
J (fd, D)− J
(
f
†, D
)]
+O
(
log (1/δ)
Λn
)
.
(14)
Define ui , vi +wi. Using Lemma 10 and Lemma 11, with
probability 1− δ, Jˆ (fd)− Jˆ (f∗) ≤
2 + 2c2 ‖fd‖
2
n2Λ2
∑
i
‖ui‖
2
(1 + c) +O
(
log (1/δ)
Λn
)
, (15)
Equation 14 is from Theorem 1 of [20], which bounds
the difference between the expected loss of any classifier
and the optimal classifier. Next, we bound ‖ui‖2 with some
probability.
Lemma 13. (Bound on error realization of random variables)
Since vi ∼ Vi and wi
i.i.d.
∼ W , ui are draws from the
distribution Vi+W . From the cumulative distribution function
of the χ2 variable, the square of their magnitude can be
bounded with some probability by
P
{∥∥V¯i + W¯∥∥2 ≤ ζ (σ2L + (σiS)2)} = γ
(
d
2 ,
ζ
2
)
Γ
(
d
2
) . (16)
The probability that the bound in Eq. 16 fails and that the
bound in 15 fails is the product of the probability that each in-
dividually fails. Thus a conservative bound is Jˆ (fd)−Jˆ (f∗) ≤
2 + 2c2 ‖fd‖
2
n2Λ2
∑
i
ζ
(
σ2L +
(
σiS
)2)
(1 + c) +O
(
log (1/δ)
Λn
)
,
(17)
with probability at least 1 − δ
(
1− γ
(
d
2 ,
ζ
2
)
/Γ
(
d
2
))
. This
result leads to Theorem 2.
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